# speech

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#### Plan: The United States Federal Government should implement the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement between the United States and the United Mexican States.

## Contention 1 is Dodd-Frank

#### Now is crunch time to pass the agreement – no da’s

**Fox News, 3/10 –** (Associated Press Staff Writer for Fox News. October 3, 2010. “Joint U.S.-Mexico Gulf Oil Drilling Deal Held Up Over Disagreements In Congress,” <http://www.reefrelieffounders.com/drilling/2013/10/04/fox-news-joint-u-s-mexico-gulf-oil-drilling-deal-held-up-over-disagreements-in-congress/)//SDL>

¶ Along with the budget and immigration, one more thing that the Senate and House can’t mutually agree upon is the proposed joint U.S.-Mexico effort to develop offshore oil and gas fields along the two countries’ maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico.¶ Both the Mexican government and many in Washington want to nail down the agreement soon, but its ratification by the U.S. Congress has been delayed by a dispute between the House and Senate over whether oil and gas producers should be required to publicly disclose their payments to foreign governments.¶ Mexico almost immediately ratified the treaty but the agreement has stalled on Capitol Hill as the House-passed version exempts oil and gas companies from disclosing their payments.¶ SUMMARY¶ The U.S. and Mexico have tried for decades to figure out a plan for divvying up the oil and gas resources in the Gulf, but a 2000 moratorium was placed on drilling in the region to allow time for the development of a joint plan. From that point on, the U.S. began expanding its drilling operations closer and closer to the maritime border in the Gulf, as Mexico grew increasingly concerned that the U.S. could be siphoning from deposits located on their side of the border.¶ “It is the hope that, through this Agreement and the proposed energy reforms in Mexico, the energy revolution the U.S. is currently experiencing can extend throughout the Western Hemisphere,” Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon said in a statement Tuesday during a meeting of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. “This would make our region more competitive and less reliant on politically tumultuous states for obtaining energy.”¶ The U.S. and Mexico have tried for decades to figure out a plan for divvying up the oil and gas resources in the Gulf, but a 2000 moratorium was placed on drilling in the region to allow time for the development of a joint plan. From that point on the U.S. began expanding its drilling operations closer and closer to the maritime border in the Gulf, as Mexico grew increasingly concerned that the U.S. could be siphoning from deposits located on their side of the border.¶ The joint agreement is meant to set explicit guidelines for where each country can drill and provide the United States “substantial geopolitical, energy security and environmental benefits, while potentially helping the U.S. oil and gas industry gain access to a huge market that may offer jobs and gains across a long value chain,” the Brookings Institution stated earlier this year.¶ For Mexico, a ratified agreement would provide Latin America’s second-largest economy with new technology and investment needed to develop hard-to-reach regions along with giving a major boost to President Enrique Peña Nieto’s push for energy reform that includes opening the country’s state-run oil company -Pemex – to foreign investment.¶ “The motive for the U.S. is ‘We’re ready to drill, but we don’t want to drill ourselves into a legal nightmare,’” said George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence, an industry newsletter based in Houston, according to the Christian Science Monitor. “For Mexico, it’s ‘We want to make certain our oil rights are protected so that if they start drilling on the U.S. side – and discover crossborder oil – we have architecture in place to protect our interests.”¶ Besides the exemptions for oil and gas companies, the specter of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill looms heavy over drilling in the Gulf. Environmental activists argue that the U.S. and oil companies have not learned their lessons from the BP spill that left 11 people dead and dumped around 4.2 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.¶ “[O]ur continued emphasis on expanding offshore drilling is slowing the necessary investment in clean energy projects that will stimulate the economy without the attendant risks, and help to alleviate the worst impacts of climate change,” said Jacqueline Savitz, vice president for U.S. oceans at the conservation organization Oceana during Tuesday’s hearing.¶ If finally approved, the agreement will be the first major test to Peña Nieto’s energy reform plan. The Mexican leader has already taken heat for his proposal to open Pemex up to foreign investment – with opponents claiming the move is tantamount to Mexico losing its sovereignty.¶ If the agreement is not ratified by Congress by Jan. 17, 2014 then the moratorium in place will expire and it is unlikely that either country will drill in the region.

#### Our aff is inherent and avoids the link to politics

**Boman, 13 –** (Karen Boman, Associated Press Staff Writer for RigZone. October 14, 2013. “Senate Passes US-Mexico Drilling Pact,” http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil\_gas/a/129582/Senate\_Passes\_USMexico\_Drilling\_Pact)//SDL

The U.S. Senate passed a bill Saturday that would implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. The Senate passed the bill by “unanimous consent”, avoiding a roll call vote, The Hill reported on Sunday. Last year, government officials from the two countries signed the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, which would establish rules for developing oil and gas resources along the United States’ maritime border with Mexico. In June, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act (H.R. 1613), which would enact the terms of the agreement signed by the Obama administration and Mexico to govern how to explore, develop, and share revenue from all oil and gas resources along the Gulf of Mexico’s maritime border. H.R. 1613 would lift the current moratorium on exploration and production along the Western Gap section of the boundary, opening up 1.5 million acres in the Gulf previously off limits due to border issues, and provide a framework for the safe management of oil and gas resources in the boundary area. While the Senate bill has bipartisan support, the Senate bill differs from the version passed by the House in June. The House version grants waivers for companies under the pact from a Dodd-Frank law mandate to disclose payments to foreign governments, the Hill reported, while the Senate version does not offer such waivers, The Hill reported.

**Dodd Frank is key to transparency rules in the oil industry – EU modeling proves - exemption in the TBHA would undermine the US model**

**Gary, 13 –** (Ian Gary, Senior Policy Manager for Extractive Industries at Oxfam America. May 9, 2013. “A back door attack on oil payment transparency,” http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2013/05/09/a-back-door-attack-on-oil-payment-transparency/)//SDL

Oxfam has no problem with the approval of the US-Mexico TBA which simply lays out the rules for how hydrocarbons reserves in the Gulf of Mexico that straddle our maritime borders would be developed.¶ We do have a big problem with an irrelevant provision inserted into the bill designed to weaken the payment disclosure requirements in Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, also known as the Cardin-Lugar provision. That law provides for the annual disclosure of payments made by oil, gas and mining companies to host governments around the world – final rules were issued by the SEC in August last year. H.R. 1613 would exempt any covered company from reporting payments from in accordance with any transboundary hydrocarbons agreement anywhere in the world.¶ The American Petroleum Institute (API) – backed by companies such as Exxon, Shell, Chevron and BP – is suing the SEC in federal court and is now hoping that its Congressional allies can help weaken this landmark law. Oxfam is intervening to defend the rule. Meanwhile, the European Union has reached agreement to put in place similar reporting requirements.¶ I spoke this week with Neil Brown who was, until very recently, a top Senate Republican aide working on energy issues for Senator Lugar, who was the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His response: “this exemption is unnecessary and inclusion would only forestall quick approval of this important agreement.”¶ He should know. As both the co-author of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff report for Senator Lugar on “Oil, Mexico and the Transboundary Agreement” as well as someone intimately familiar with the “Cardin-Lugar” provision in Dodd-Frank, Mr. Brown would know if the reporting requirements in Dodd-Frank Section 1504 present any issue in approving the US-Mexico TBA. The short answer – they don’t. The minority staff report envisions reporting under Section 1504 and says that under Section 1504 covered companies “would already have to disclose payments” to the SEC if “they invest in Mexico”.¶ The US-Mexico TBA requires that certain information be kept confidential unless disclosure is required by law. The TBA text demonstrates that the US and Mexico have already made the correct policy judgment that the specific confidentiality provisions of the TBA should be subordinated to each country’s commitment to openness and subject to each country’s disclosure requirements. Nothing in the TBA would require the exemption provided by H.R. 1613.¶ Tellingly, the Senate Energy Committee has introduced a bi-partisan bill, S. 812, sponsored by Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) to approve the US-Mexico TBA, and it contains no Section 1504 exemption provision. If Congress is truly interested in approving this agreement and providing the “rules of the road” for joint development of oil and gas reserves straddling the US-Mexico maritime boundary, then it should adopt the clean Senate bill without the reporting exemption.¶ Former Senator Jeff Bingaman, past Senate Energy Committee chairman, told Reuters that the exemption proposed by the House “complicates things significantly” for passage of the bill. Referring to the Section 1504 exemption language, he said, “They’ve added in some things that are going to make it difficult to pass in that form.”¶ The Mexican Congress ratified the TBA a year ago, and the Obama administration – and the oil industry – would like to see it approved. The Obama administration, though, has made clear that implementation of Section 1504 is a priority.¶ In a letter to Oxfam, Sec. of State Kerry said, “The Department of State and Administration strongly support transparency in the extractives sectors, as outlined in Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank, and the new rule issued by the SEC. The new SEC standard directly advances our foreign policy interest in increasing transparency and reducing corruption, particularly in the oil, gas and mineral sectors.”

#### Dodd-Frank solves corruption in Afghanistan - the impact is stability

**Clough, 10 -** (Christine, coordinator of the Task Force on Financial Integrity 26 Economic Development. August 3, 2010. Using Transparency to Avoid the Resource Curse in Afghanistan, Financial Transparency Coalition, p. http://www.financialtransparency.org/2010/08/03/using-transparency-to-avoid-the-resource-curse-in-afghanistan/)

¶ Additionally, the disclosure of corporate profits on a country-by-country-basis would aid civil society groups and donors in the fight against corruption and cronyism in Afghanistan. Extractive industry experts will be able to estimate whether the revenue figures disclosed by a corporation are accurate based on their knowledge of the deposits and the industry. Relatively accurate revenue figures will in turn support better estimates of government revenue, which outside parties can then compare to figures released by the government on its receipts and expenditures—as discrepancies between the two sources could suggest corruption. The net result of a country-by-country reporting standard is the potential for more of the wealth generated by Afghanistan’s mineral resources to actually reach and benefit the general population.¶ ¶ Transparent management and reporting of Afghanistan’s natural resources would be a win-win situation for all the parties involved. The central government will have more revenue, which can then be spent on development; infrastructure; and proper, timely payment of government employees (including the military and police). The happier, wealthier populous will generate greater legitimacy for political leaders, which contributes to improved government and social stability. Mining companies will, in turn, benefit from a stable and lawful environment in which to operate eventually improving their bottom line. Allied governments—and their people—would then transition from the role of donor to a desperate country into investors in a dynamic and rapidly developing country.¶ ¶ Significant progress was made towards country-by-country reporting this past month when the United States Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The legislation included the Energy Security Through Transparency (ESTT) provision, which requires all companies working in the extractive industries and registered with the SEC (i.e. 90% of all major international companies working in the extractive industries) to disclose all payments made to host governments on an on-going basis. That’s major progress, and it will significantly help curtail corruption in resource-rich countries like Afghanistan. However, it’s not until we report corporate profits on a country-by-country basis, that we’ll achieve full transparency in this crucial sector.

#### Afghanistan collapse escalates to global nuclear war

**Morgan, 7** (Stephen J., Political Writer and Former Member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan21?", 9-23, http://www.freearticlesarchive .com/article/\_Better\_another\_Taliban\_Afghanistanthan\_a\_Taliban\_NUCLEAR\_Pakistan\_/99961/0/)

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

**Specifically, Indo-Pak war goes nuclear**

**Caldicott 2** (Helen, Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility and Nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, “The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex”, p. xiii)

The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy could respond in kind. China, India’s hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America’s 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth.

**Dodd Frank is key to transparency to set a global norm against corruption in Africa**

**Geman, 13** – (Ben Geman, Associated Press Staff Writer for The Hill. April 26, 2013. “Senate bill on US-Mexico drilling lacks Dodd-Frank exemption” http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/296451-senate-bill-on-us-mexico-drilling-lacks-dodd-frank-exemption-)//SDL

“API is hopeful that Congress and the administration will address the problematic 1504 rules, and we certainly would like to see these important 1504 exemptions make it through to a final bill so that U.S. companies can compete on a level playing field,” he said, referring to the numerical section of the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial law that required the disclosure rule.¶ But backers of the SEC requirement oppose the exemption in the House bill and are concerned the bill is part of a wider effort to repeal the SEC rule.¶ The rule will require SEC-listed oil, natural gas and mining companies to disclose payments to foreign governments related to projects in their countries, such as money for production licenses, royalties and so forth.¶ It is aimed at undoing the “resource curse,” in which some impoverished countries in Africa and elsewhere are plagued by corruption and conflict alongside their energy and mineral wealth.

#### Exemptions undermine transparency laws – they create a race to the bottom of non-disclosure – our evidence is Africa Specific Geman, 11 – (Ben Geman, Associated Press Staff Writer for The Hill. March 1, 2011. “It’s George Soros versus Exxon in fight over oil payment disclosures,” http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/146749-its-george-soros-against-exxon-on-oil-payments-disclosure)//SDL

¶ “I believe it is not an exaggeration to say that in promulgating the U.S. regulations for Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank, the Commission will be setting the rules for much of the world. I urge the Commission to fulfill its responsibility in the strongest and clearest manner possible to fulfill the clear intent of the U.S. Congress to make these important financial flows between companies and governments fully transparent to investors and the general public, country by country and project by project.”¶ ¶ The provision in the Wall Street law is aimed at ending the “resource curse” in which some energy- and mineral-rich nations in Africa and elsewhere are plagued by high levels of corruption, conflict and poverty.¶ ¶ A suite of energy companies, in comments to the regulators, say they favor disclosure but warn that prescriptive rules would be burdensome and place them at a competitive disadvantage compared to certain state-backed oil companies from countries such as Russia and China.¶ ¶ In addition, Exxon and other companies are pushing the SEC to allow exemptions in cases where host countries or contracts don’t allow project-specific payment disclosures.¶ ¶ “[I]t is essential for the Commission to provide an exemption for disclosure that is prohibited by foreign governments or existing contracts in order to avoid irreparable harm to investors, efficiency, competition and capital formation,” Exxon wrote in late January comments to the SEC.¶ ¶ But Soros is pushing back against the industry push for such exemptions. The SEC asked for input on the question when floating draft rules last year.¶ ¶ “[The Commission should not allow exemptions where the laws of the host country prohibit disclosure. It is precisely in these countries, which prevent transparency and disclosure of information, where the greatest investment risk lies. Such an exemption would create an incentive for countries to create such laws, thereby undermining the purpose and intent of the statute to provide information to investors and promote international transparency,” Soros writes.

Corruption over energy is the key internal link to stability – must avoid the resource curse

Conway ‘12

J. Edward Conway, doctoral candidate and postgraduate researcher at the Institute for Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies at the University of St Andrews and independent political risk consultant for mining companies in Central Asia 12 [“How Afghanistan Can Escape the Resource Curse,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137306/j-edward-conway/how-afghanistan-can-escape-the-resource-curse]

Until just a few weeks ago, serious talk about an Afghan economy based on natural resources seemed premature. But as Kabul inks more mining deals with international investors -- it awarded two major tenders at the end of 2011 -- and as NATO continues its drawdown of international troops, natural resources are shaping up to serve as the cornerstone of sustainable development there. This raises an unavoidable and possibly tragic question: Considering the country's lack of infrastructure and its rampant corruption, will Afghanistan become yet another data point in the literature on underdeveloped countries that fall victim to the resource curse?¶ The possibility is real. Officials in both Washington and Kabul claim that the country's mineral wealth is worth as much as $3 trillion. Experts have suspected Afghanistan's resource potential for decades, and U.S. Geological Survey fieldwork conducted between 2009 and 2011 confirmed the existence of significant copper, iron ore, gold, lithium, rare earths, and mineral fuel resources such as coal, oil, and gas, and possibly even uranium.¶ But several countries in Central Asia have struggled with exactly these challenges in recent decades -- and offer a valuable guide to Kabul, Washington, and international investors. ¶ Mining corporations and the Afghan government have wasted no time. In late 2011, Afghanistan's Ministry of Mines signed an oil exploration and production deal with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation to develop the Amu Darya basin's 80 million barrels of estimated crude reserves over the next 25 years; production is expected to begin this year. At the moment, the ministry is finalizing details with an Indian consortium of mining companies to develop the Hajigak deposit, one of the largest undeveloped iron ore deposits in the world, which has the potential to produce steel for the next 40 years. Both of these deals come after Kabul signed over to the Chinese the rights to the Aynak copper deposit in 2008, and the Qara Zaghan gold deposit to a consortium of investors gathered together by J. P. Morgan in early 2011. Taken together, these first forays into Afghanistan's newfound subterranean treasure chest will mean billions of dollars in investment over the next decade; there will be new rail infrastructure, power plants, and possibly even a refinery. Kabul will reap significant new tax revenues, and tens of thousands of Afghans will be put to work.¶ Unconditional celebration, however, would be premature. Agreements notwithstanding, not a single mine has produced anything tangible -- not even the almost four-year-old Aynak copper mine, which will allegedly begin operation next year. Chinese investors also appear to be sliding on their promise to build a railroad as a part of the Aynak deal. Because of likely high operating costs, it remains unclear when the J. P. Morgan consortium will be able to produce an ounce of gold that competes at market prices.¶ What's more, estimates for trillion-dollar earnings are almost entirely based on resources, not reserves -- a technical but critical difference. Reserve estimates incorporate economic, legal, social, governmental, and environmental risks to determine what is actually profitable to develop, as well as the site-specific mining and metallurgical challenges. Resource estimates result in optimistic press releases; reserve estimates result in foreign investment, jobs, and budgetary contributions. Kabul and Washington have focused on signing deals, thinking that a few key agreements would soothe the concerns of risk-averse investors. But the real challenge for the industry will be in production. And the test for Afghanistan -- herein lies the possibility of a curse -- will be whether or not a majority of the country reaps the secondary benefits of the mining sector's development.¶ Resource curse theories follow two tracks. On the first, the overwhelming revenue drawn from the sector exacerbates corruption within the government. That scenario is hardly difficult to imagine in Afghanistan, as the country is currently considered the second most corrupt in the world, according to Transparency International. On the second track, increased mineral exports strengthen a country's currency and consequently crowd out other sectors (such as agriculture) from being competitive on the world market. This is a threat in Afghanistan, clearly, as its economy is largely dependent on farming. ¶ But several countries in Central Asia have struggled with exactly these challenges in recent decades -- and offer a valuable guide to Kabul, Washington, and international investors. Many states in the region are blessed with mineral wealth but cursed by infrastructure obstacles and social instability; accordingly, they have faced challenges in attracting foreign investors, cultivating resources without losing profits to graft, and avoiding introducing new divisions among the population. The most important lesson for Afghanistan to learn is that it will have to build a resource-based economy with the support of local Afghans. ¶ Take Kyrgyzstan, a mountainous, landlocked country with little rail infrastructure, deteriorating roads, and an economy based on foreign aid, remittances, and mining. Until recently, successive authoritarian leaders since the mid-1990s, such as Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev, advised foreign mining companies to avoid getting involved locally; a few token social projects to placate the people living near a project would suffice. But keeping out of local affairs has backfired. Mining revenues were funneled to elites in the capital, and a negligible percentage went to the local community for development and infrastructure projects.¶ Over time, local miners moved their families (and wealth) to the capital city; the loss of revenue and investment left the mining towns without running water or a functioning sewage system. In Barskaun, the only paved road is the one that leads to the mine -- Kumtor, a single gold mine, which represents ten percent of the country's GDP. That neglect not only shortchanged the locals but breeds insecurity today. In Aral, where there is a foreign-operated gold mine, armed men on horseback caused a million dollars' worth of damage in October 2011, forcing the site to remain closed until a settlement was reached with villagers three months later.¶ But then consider Kazakhstan, where the opposite has happened. The country of 16 million is an oil and gas exporter but also a global leader in copper, iron ore, chromite, lead, zinc, gold, coal, and uranium reserves and production. Since its independence in the 1990s, both foreign investors and government officials have focused on socioeconomic development in the areas surrounding key mining sites; today mines serve as a catalyst for province-wide growth. Managers and workers live locally, spend locally, and educate their children locally.¶ Astana has imposed strict requirements on foreign miners -- forcing them to sign annual memorandums of cooperation with local governors, under which both parties together determine the social investment projects to be funded by the firm in the province for that year. The strategy dates back to the Soviet era, when most of these mining operations had their hand in all aspects of the local community. Today this is reflected in foreign mining companies funding schools, gyms, sports stadiums, daycare centers, and orphanages and foster care networks, as well as providing electric-power capacity to homes and businesses across the country. Not coincidently, Kazakhstan ranks far ahead of all other Central Asian states on country risk indices for foreign investors.¶ Unfortunately, at the moment Afghanistan is looking more like the former than the latter. Politically the country is already overly centralized in Kabul, and with Aynak and Hajigak within driving distance, it's not difficult to envision a future where the benefits of the extractive sector remain in the capital. Further, while all foreign developers are required to invest in development projects, it remains to be seen if these firms will make good on their promises and if local leaders will be empowered in the subsequent decision-making process. Whereas Kazakhstan enforces strict production and investment quotas -- if you don't produce and invest as you promised, you're out -- citing force majeure in Afghanistan (from war to civil disturbances to labor issues) seems like an easy way for Aynak and Hajigak to renege on local commitments, potentially aggravating the existing socioeconomic gap between Kabul and the rest of the country.¶ It all comes back to ensuring a positive correlation between increased foreign investment and improved quality of life. In Kyrgyzstan you have armed men on horseback; in Kazakhstan you have local athletes wearing jerseys sporting the foreign miner's logo. There's no question that there are significant differences between the situation in Afghanistan and those in the Central Asian states. Afghanistan's levels of corruption and violence are far higher, the education level is much lower, and on transport infrastructure and power capacity issues, it is starting from scratch. But just as Kabul's mining deals to date are little more than agreements on paper, the unsettled nature of the larger issues can provide an opportunity to forge a path ahead. If Afghanistan wants to achieve that positive correlation of foreign investment with local quality of life -- and in doing so open the gates to foreign investment from the more risk-averse -- the Kabul-based elites and their foreign miners will need to spread the wealth.

**Corruption in Africa causes wars, genocide and humanitarian disasters – only transparent democracies can solve**

**Diamond, 98**  (Larry Diamond, Senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. January 1998. “Restoring Democracy in Africa,” http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-20301225/restoring-democracy-in-africa )//SDL

¶ The common root cause of economic decay, state collapse, ethnic violence, civil war, and humanitarian disaster in Africa is bad, abusive governance. Because most states lack any semblance of a rule of law and norms of accountability that bind the conduct of those in government, their societies have fallen prey to massive corruption, nepotism, and the personal whims of a tiny ruling elite.¶ ¶ In such circumstances, every political clique and ethnic group struggles for control of a stagnant or diminishing stock of wealth. There are no trust, institutions to facilitate cooperation, or confidence in the future. Every competing faction tries to grab what it can for the moment while excluding other groups.¶ ¶ The only real antidote to this decay is a constitutional framework that facilitates the limitation, separation, devolution, and sharing of power so that each group can have a stake in the system while checking the ruling elite and one another. In essence, this means a democratic political system, to one degree or another.¶ ¶ Given Africa's authoritarian history, many changes in beliefs and institutions will be necessary for democracy to emerge. A growing segment of African elites and the public realizes that every type of dictatorship on the continent has been a disaster. Thus, there is increasing hunger for economic and political freedom and the predictability of a democratic constitution.¶ ¶ As Hoover Institution senior fellow Barry Weingast pointed out in the American Political Science Review, contending that ethnic groups will not trust and tolerate one another and cooperate for a larger national good unless there are credible limits on the state. Democracy can not be stable unless rulers see that it is in their interest to abide by the rules. What makes it in their interest is the overriding commitment of all major ethnic groups, parties, and interest organizations to a constitution.

**African instability goes nuclear.**

**Deutsch, 02** (Jeffrey, Founder of the Rabid Tigers Project, Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9, "The Nuclear Family Has Become Over-Extended," November 18, <http://list.webengr.com/pipermail/picoipo/2002-November/000208.html>)

The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

## Contention 2 Hegemony

#### Hegemony is sustainable – but the US must walk carefully – policy choices that endorse multilateral leadership are key

Beckley 2012, Michael Beckley, PHD Columbia, assistant professor of political science at Tufts University specializing in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, 2012, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited”, PDF, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fcatalog%2Fac%3A146399&ei=I1mZUaOnMMLk0gH9iICoCw&usg=AFQjCNGKp8jw7t-cvRknlrP0qcv6Z7M41w&sig2=EcwCKI0jGPs3NkMrxYYY5g&bvm=bv.46751780,d.dmQ>

The growing consensus in U.S. academic and policymaking circles is that unipolarity is a temporary aberration that soon will be swept away. The most recent National Intelligence Council report, for example, claims that “the international system...will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers” and “will be a global multipolar one.”6 Among academics, “it is widely perceived that the international political system is in flux and that the post-­‐ Cold War era of American preeminence is winding down.”7 Book stores are filled with titles such as The Post-­‐American World, The End of the American Era, When China Rules the World, and Becoming China’s Bitch. And opinion polls show that pluralities of people in most countries believe that China is already the world’s dominant economic power.8 If this conventional wisdom is correct, then the United States faces an extraordinary challenge. The Argument In the pages that follow, I argue that such declinist beliefs are exaggerated and that the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era. First, I show that the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and in some areas increased, its lead over other countries since 1991. Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as sufficient conditions for U.S. relative decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly. Second, I find that U.S. hegemony is profitable in certain areas. The United States delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling its own resources, and some of its allies resources, into enhancing its own military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Third, I conclude that globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States. Taken together, these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity. For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

#### Three Internal Links:

#### The first internal link is oil dependence:

#### THA eases Middle Eastern oil dependence

Committee on Natural Resources, 13 – (Senate Committee on Natural Resources. June 27, 2013. “House Votes to Approve Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement with Mexico,” http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=340794)//SDL

The bill would open up nearly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico that is estimated to contain as much as 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas. This would expand U.S. energy production, create new American jobs, lower energy prices, and generate tens of millions of dollars in new revenue. ¶ The bill would also put into place an important and transparent framework for future implementation of similar transboundary hydrocarbon agreements with other nations.¶ “By passing this Transboundary Agreement, the House has furthered its commitment to create jobs though energy. This legislation implements a first of its kind agreement with the government of Mexico to develop shared resources located between our two countries in the Gulf. The legislation also opens roughly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico for production, and would help create American jobs and grow our economy in the process,” said Rep. Jeff Duncan (SC-03). “According to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the U.S. State Department, these areas are estimated to contain 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas, a considerable amount that will lessen our dependence on Middle Eastern sources of oil. The agreement also prioritizes safety by requiring that all operations in the region conform to U.S. safety standards, and establishes a framework for possible future arrangements with other neighboring countries like Canada. Simply put, this legislation is a win-win for our country, and I am proud that it received strong bipartisan support.” ¶ “These areas in the Gulf of Mexico are ready to be explored and developed and this bill will give U.S. job creators the certainty they need to move forward. Activity can begin once this agreement is enacted,” said Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings. “The Natural Resources Committee and Congressman Duncan have worked hard to advance this bill and get it signed into law. It’s important to American energy, American jobs and American energy security. And it is important to supporting a positive relationship with our neighbor to the south, Mexico.”

#### Oil dependence draws the US into Middle East conflicts and decimates US Hegemony

Josef Braml, editor-in-chief of the Yearbook on International Relations, 2007, The Washington Quarterly 30.4 (2007) 117-130, “Can the United States Shed Its Oil Addiction?”

If the United States continues its overreliance on fossil fuels, it will become increasingly dependent on producing nations that are unstable and that pose a risk to its interests and could come into conflict with other consumer states. [End Page 118] Although the United States can still count on Canada and Mexico, which are its two most important petroleum providers, its tense relationship with Venezuela illustrates the challenges in securing energy resources even in its own backyard, let alone the Middle East and other volatile areas. Some observers of petropolitics go as far as to describe an "axis of oil" (Russia, China, and eventually Iran) at work that is "acting as a counterweight to American hegemony" and will deprive the United States of its oil supplies and strategic interests.6

**Oil wars cause extinction**

**Lendman 07 –** Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Stephen Lendman, “Resource Wars - Can We Survive Them?,” rense.com, 6-6-7, pg. http://www.rense.com/general76/resrouce.htm)

With the world's energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and "peak oil" near or approaching, **"security" for America means assuring a** sustainable **supply of what we can't do without**. It includes waging wars to get it, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. **That means** energy's partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, militarism, **wars, ecological recklessness, and** now **a**n extremist **US** administration **willing to risk Armageddon** for world dominance. Central to its plan is first controlling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with oil and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New "Great Game" and Perils From It The new "Great Game's" begun, but this time the stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasn't oil. This time, it's the US with help from Israel, Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with today's weapons and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys. ***At stake is more than oil. It's planet earth with survival of all life on it*** issue number one twice over. Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing, peace declining, and the planet's ability to sustain life front and center, if anyone's paying attention. They'd better be because beyond the point of no return, there's no second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones." Under a worst case scenario, it's more dire than that. There may be **nothing left but resilient beetles and bacteria** in the wake of a nuclear holocaust meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. **The threat is real** and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedy's "quarantine" line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

#### Second internal link is US-Mexico relations:

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Third Internal Link is Dodd-Frank:

**Exemptions destroy multilateralism – it ruins US leadership on international transparency norms**

**PWPC, 13 –** (PWYPC, coalition including Revenue Watch Institute, Global Financial Integrity, OxFam America, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch. June 26, 2013. <http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE_26JUNE2013.pdf)//SDL>

¶ ¶ ¶ Cardin-Lugar disclosures will increase transparency in extractive development, fostering stable investment ¶ ¶ and operating environments for U.S. companies, and providing investors with high-quality, consistent ¶ ¶ information to assess companies’ risk exposure in oil, gas and mineral-rich countries. Transparency will also ¶ ¶ increase government accountability in these countries, which is critical to the U.S. foreign policy objective ¶ ¶ of reducing extreme poverty by combating corruption, fraud and waste in resource-rich developing ¶ ¶ countries, to end the so-called “resource-curse.” For this reason, Cardin-Lugar forms part of U.S. energy ¶ ¶ security and multilateral foreign policy, and has the support of the Administration. ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The U.S. is not alone in this effort. Cardin-Lugar is the foundation of a global standard of extractives ¶ ¶ transparency being adopted by leading capital markets. In early June, the European Union voted to adopt ¶ ¶ equivalent reporting requirements for its 27 member states, Canada committed to adopt similar reporting ¶ ¶ requirements, and the G8 committed to adopt common standards for extractives transparency. In addition, ¶ ¶ the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary initiative that operates in more than 35 ¶ ¶ countries and is supported the world’s largest oil, gas and mining companies, including Exxon Mobil, ¶ ¶ Chevron, ConocoPhillips, BP, Shell and others, revised its rules in May to ensure its disclosure requirements ¶ ¶ are consistent with Cardin-Lugar and EU rules. ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The anti-transparency provision in H.R.1613 would therefore contradict this global effort and the interests ¶ ¶ of U.S. investors, while undermining U.S. energy security and foreign policy objectives. The provision reads ¶ ¶ as follows: ¶ ¶ ‘(d) EXEMPTION FROM RESOURCES EXTRACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Actions taken ¶ ¶ by a public company in accordance with any transboundary hydrocarbon agreement shall not ¶ ¶ constitute the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals for purposes of section ¶ ¶ 13(q) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (157U.S.C. 78m(q)).

**Counterplan turns the case – exemptions kill US international leadership**

**PWPC, 13 –** (PWYPC, coalition including Revenue Watch Institute, Global Financial Integrity, OxFam America, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch. June 26, 2013. <http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE_26JUNE2013.pdf)//SDL>

The exemption provision would weaken U.S. global leadership and influence. As mentioned above, Cardin-Lugar laid the foundations for a new global standard for excratives transparency. The EU disclosure rules and commitments on disclosure by Canada and the G8 are based on the precedent set by Cardin-Lugar. The EU rules match the U.S. law and do not allow for exemptions. Providing exemptions in the U.S. – Mexico THA would signal a retreat from transparency, and send a very poor message to our strongest allies. This could erode the faith of our international partners and undermine U.S. leadership. In conclusion, transparency promotes accountability and stability and improves the global business climate for economic growth and investment, which is good for American business and our national security. For these reasons, we urge Congress to keep America’s commitments and stand up for transparency by opposing HR. 1613 in its current form, and opposing inclusion of any version of the anti-transparency language included in any legislation considered or negotiated with the Senate to codify the U.S.-Mexico THA.

#### Loss of American power projection capacity causes global war.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

#### Statistics prove – Collapse of US leadership causes great power war and extinction

Barnett 11 (Thomas P.M., Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7, CMR)

Events in Libya are a further reminder forAmericans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization**, **the U.S. military has been the** greatest force for peace the world has ever known. **Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century**, the **mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be** no identifiable human civilization left**, once** nuclear weapons **entered the killing equation.**  But **the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war**. **Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace. **We introduced the international liberal trade order known as** globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires,** an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP **and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from** state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a** 99 percent **relative** drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, **we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms**, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

#### Multilateral hegemony solves great power wars – the alternative is apolarity

Kempe 2012, Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, a foreign policy think tank and public policy group, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council since December 1, 2006, and is a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University's Saïd Business School, April 18, 2012, “Does America still want to lead the world?”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/04/18/does-america-still-want-to-lead-the-world/>,)

For all their bitter differences, President Obama and Governor Romney share one overwhelming challenge. Whoever is elected will face the growing reality that the greatest risk to global stability over the next 20 years may be the nature of America itself. Nothing – not Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons, not violent extremists or Mideast instability, not climate change or economic imbalances – will shape the world as profoundly as the ability of the United States to remain an effective and confident world player advocating its traditional global purpose of individual rights and open societies. That was the conclusion of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, a group of experts that was brought together by the World Economic Forum and that I have chaired. Even more intriguing, our group tested our views on, among others, a set of Chinese officials and experts, who worried that we would face a world overwhelmed by chaos if the U.S. – facing resource restraints, leadership fatigue and domestic political dysfunction – disengaged from its global responsibilities. U.S. leadership, with all its shortcomings and missteps, has been the glue and underwriter of global stability since World War Two – more than any other nation. Even with the world experiencing its greatest shift of economic and political power since the 19th century, no other country is emerging – or looks likely to emerge – that would be as prepared or equipped to exercise leadership on behalf of the global good. Yet many in the world are questioning the role of U.S. leadership, the governance architecture it helped create and even the values for which the U.S. stands. Weary from a decade of war and strained financially, Americans themselves are rethinking whether they can afford global purpose. The election campaign is unlikely to shed much light on these issues, yet both candidates face an inescapable truth: How the U.S. evolves over the next 15 to 20 years will be most important single variable (and the greatest uncertainty) hovering over the global future. And the two most important elements that will shape the U.S. course, in the view of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, will be American intentions and the capability to act on them. In short, will Americans continue to see as part of their identity the championing of values such as individual opportunity and open societies that have contributed so richly to the global commons? Second, can the U.S. sufficiently address its domestic challenges to assure its economic, political and societal strength while the world changes at unprecedented velocity? Consider this: It took Great Britain 155 years to double its gross domestic product per capita in the 18th and 19th centuries, when it was the world’s leading power. It took the U.S. 50 years to do the same by 1950, when its population was 152 million. Both India and China have achieved the same growth on a scale and at a pace never experienced before. Both countries have more than a hundred times the population of Britain during its heyday, yet they are achieving similar outcomes in a tenth of the time. Although China will likely surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2030, Americans retain distinct advantages that could allow them to remain the pivotal power. Think of Uncle Sam as a poker player sitting at a global table of cohorts, holding better cards than anyone else: a free and vibrant society, a history of technological innovation, an ability to attract capital and generate jobs, and a relatively young and regenerating population. However, it doesn’t matter how good your cards are if you’re playing them poorly. Put another way, the candidate who wins in November is going to be faced with the reality summed up by the cartoon character Pogo in 1971 as he was trying to make his way through a prickly primeval forest without proper footwear: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” Imagine two very different scenarios for the world, based on how America rises to its challenges. The positive scenario would require whoever is elected in November to be a unifier, someone who can rise above our current squabbles and galvanize not only the U.S. but also the world around a greater understanding of this historic moment. He would address the larger U.S. issues of failing infrastructure, falling educational standards, widening deficits and spiraling healthcare costs. He would partner more effectively with rising powers, and China in particular. And he would recognize and act upon the strategic stake the U.S. has in a politically confident, economically healthy Europe. The doubling of the global middle class by a billion people by 2030 plays into U.S. political and economic strengths, increasing demand for the products and services of information technology where the U.S. excels. Developments that improve the extraction of shale natural gas and oil provide the U.S. and some of its allies disproportionate benefits. Under this positive scenario, the U.S. could log growth rates of 2.7 percent or more each year, compared with 2.5 percent over the past 20 years. Average living standards could rise by 40 percent through 2030, keeping alive the American dream and restoring the global attractiveness of the U.S. model. The negative scenario results from a U.S. that fails to rise to its current challenges. Great powers decline when they fail to address the problems they recognize. U.S. growth could slow to an average of 1.5 percent per year, if that. The knock-on impact on the world economy could be a half-percent per year. The shift in the perception of the U.S. as a descending power would be more pronounced. This sort of United States would be increasingly incapable of leading and disinclined to try. It is an America that would be more likely to be protectionist and less likely to retool global institutions to make them more effective. One can already see hints of what such a world would look like. Middle Eastern diplomats in Washington say the failure of the U.S. to orchestrate a more coherent and generous transatlantic and international response to their region’s upheavals has resulted in a free-for-all for influence that is favoring some of the least enlightened players. Although the U.S. has responded to the euro zone crisis, as a result of its own economic fears, it hasn’t offered a larger vision for the transatlantic future that recognizes its enormous strategic stake in Europe’s future, given global shifts of influence. The U.S. played a dominant role in reconstructing the post-World War Two international order. The question is whether it will do so again or instead contribute to a dangerous global power vacuum that no one over the next two decades is willing or capable of filling.

#### AND – American involvement is inevitable – decline causes lash out and great power wars

Brzezinski 12 Zbigniew, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, PHD, JAN/FEB, “After America”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>,)

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

## Contention 3 is Drilling

#### Deepwater oil accident inevitable in the Gulf of Mexico

**Shields, 12 –** (David, independent energy consultant. “QandA: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf?”, Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor, 2/20/2012, <http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/20477/Is%20Mexico%20Prepared%20for%20Deepwater%20Drilling%20in%20the%20Gulf.pdf?sequence=1)//SDL>. EJW.)

"They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders. ¶ That is probably how we should understand Pemex's decision to drill the Maximino-1 well in ¶ 3,000 meters of water in the Perdido Fold Belt, right next to the shared maritime boundary with ¶ the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or ¶ production goals. It is about defending the final frontier of national sovereignty and sticking the ¶ Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico to advise U.S. companies that they have no right ¶ to drill for oil in the ultradeep waters on the Mexican side. The recently signed deepwater ¶ agreement obliges both countries to work together and share the spoils of the development of transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional ¶ restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as Pemex and its ¶ contractors have no experience in such harsh environments. In fact, Pemex has never produced ¶ oil commercially anywhere in deep water. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case ¶ scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not ¶ fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. ¶ On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon ¶ spill, has come and gone. The next disaster is just waiting to happen."

#### Gulf’s ecosystems on the brink—plan key to solve another accident

**Craig, 11 –** (Robert Kundis Craig, Attorneys’ Title Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University. “Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell”, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2011, http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1326405133\_03craig.fin.pdf)//SDL

These results suggest that we should be very concerned for the ¶ Gulf ecosystems affected by the Macondo well blowout. First, and as ¶ this Article has emphasized throughout, unlike the Exxon Valdez¶ spill, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred at great depth, and the ¶ oil behaved unusually compared to oil released on the surface. ¶ Second, considerably more toxic dispersants were used in connection ¶ with the Gulf oil spill than the Alaska oil spill.164 Third, humans ¶ could intervene almost immediately to begin cleaning the rocky ¶ substrate in Prince William Sound, but human intervention for many ¶ of the important affected Gulf ecosystems, especially the deepwater ¶ ones (but even for shallower coral reefs**),** remains impossible. ¶ Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Prince William Sound ¶ was and remains a far less stressed ecosystem than the Gulf of ¶ Mexico. In 2008, for example, NOAA stated that “[d]espite the ¶ remaining impacts of the [still then] largest oil spill in U.S. history, ¶ Prince William Sound remains a relatively pristine, productive and ¶ biologically rich ecosystem.”165 To be sure, the Sound was not ¶ completely unstressed, and “[w]hen the Exxon Valdez spill occurred ¶ in March 1989, the Prince William Sound ecosystem was also ¶ responding to at least three notable events in its past: an unusually ¶ cold winter in 1988–89; growing populations of reintroduced sea ¶ otters; and a 1964 earthquake.”166 Nevertheless, the Gulf of Mexico ¶ is besieged by environmental stressors at another order of magnitude ¶ (or two), reducing its resilience to disasters like the Deepwater ¶ Horizon oil spill. As the Deepwater Horizon Commission detailed at ¶ length, the Gulf faces an array of long-term threats, from the loss of ¶ protective and productive wetlands along the coast to hurricanes to a ¶ growing “dead zone” (hypoxic zone) to sediment starvation to sealevel rise to damaging channeling to continual (if smaller) oil releases ¶ from the thousands of drilling operations.167 In the face of this ¶ plethora of stressors, even the Commission championed a kind of ¶ resilience thinking, recognizing that responding to the oil spill alone ¶ was not enough. It equated restoration of the Gulf to “restored ¶ resilience,” arguing that it “represents an effort to sustain these diverse, interdependent activities [fisheries, energy, and tourism] and ¶ the environment on which they depend for future generations.”168¶ A number of commentators have catalogued the failure of the ¶ legal and regulatory systems governing the Deepwater Horizon¶ platform and the Macondo well operations.169 The Deepwater ¶ Horizon Commission similarly noted that the Deepwater Horizon’s ¶ “demise signals the conflicted evolution—and severe shortcomings—¶ of federal regulation of offshore oil drilling in the United States.”170¶ In its opinion, “[t]he Deepwater Horizon blowout, explosion, and oil ¶ spill did not have to happen.”171 The Commission’s overall ¶ conclusion was two-fold. First, “[t]he record shows **that** without ¶ effective government oversight, the offshore oil and gas industry will ¶ not adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare effectively to ¶ respond in emergencies.”172 Second, “government oversight, alone, ¶ cannot reduce those risks to the full extent possible. Government ¶ oversight . . . must be accompanied by the oil and gas industry’s ¶ internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a ¶ fundamental transformation of its safety culture.”173

#### Plan solves shortfalls in Mexico drilling safety resources—solves through straw effect, lack of experience, and uncoordinated spill plans

Philbin, et all ‘12

(“Q and A: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf.” Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor. John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy. John D. Padilla, managing director at IPD Latin America: Alejandra León, associate director for Latin America-downstream oil at IHS Cera. David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence. 2/20/12. EJW.)

**Pemex is not prepared for risks such as a spill** or other serious accident **that could happen as it ¶ plans to drill** two wells **in ultradeep waters** of the Gulf of Mexico, **said** Juan Carlos Zepeda, the ¶ **head of Mexico's National Hydrocarbons Commission**, in a Feb. 15 interview with The Wall ¶ Street Journal. According to Zepeda, his agency's resources amount to about 2 percent the size of ¶ its U.S. counterpart's budget. Pemex officials, however, say that the company is capable of ¶ carrying out its plans safely. How prepared is Mexico to deal with a serious accident in the Gulf ¶ of Mexico? Is the company sacrificing safety in its bid to improve competitiveness and meet ¶ production goals? ¶ A: John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy: ¶ "Among the lessons **learned from** the **Deepwater Horizon** incident, two are **fundamental in ¶ determining response preparedness**. First **is the importance of having a consistent national ¶ doctrine at federal, state and local levels**. Significant gaps surfaced during the Macondo blowout ¶ response because the U.S. Coast Guard operated under the United States' National Contingency ¶ Plan (NCP), which uses a top-down approach to manage the response, while state, local and ¶ elected officials operated under the Stafford Act, which is a bottom-up approach. **The second** ¶ fundamental **concern** **is awareness and knowledge** of the doctrine for those with any role in ¶ preparedness and response. Response plans and procedures developed from national doctrine ¶ must account for the complexity that will ensue, involving many jurisdictions and response ¶ elements. Adequate resources and pre-agreed collaboration mechanisms among resource ¶ providers are equally important. Note that the U.S. Coast Guard deployed some 60 boats and 2 ¶ aircraft to assist in Macondo response efforts, along with over 3,000 other boats and 127 ¶ surveillance aircraft and hundreds of individuals involved in the command and control structure. ¶ Mexico's navy, with some 200 ships total, would be severely taxed to respond to an incident, ¶ despite having some doctrine in place to deal with a spill and despite some simulations. The fact ¶ that **the** United States and Mexico signed an **agreement** this week **to collaborate on safety and ¶ response mechanisms in the Gulf of Mexico is a critical step toward safer Gulf operations—for ¶ both Mexico and the U**nited **S**tates." : John D. Padilla, managing director at IPD Latin America: ¶ "The plan at issue is Pemex's intent to drill in the Perdido Foldbelt area, which abuts the U.S.- ¶ Mexico maritime border. Although the bulk of Pemex's offshore infrastructure is located in the ¶ southern Gulf of Mexico (i.e. near Cantarell and Ku-Maloob-Zaap), Perdido represents the ¶ company's most promising near-term commercial crude oil prospect. The 18 other deepwater ¶ wells Pemex has drilled have either been principally natural gas or heavy oil; those that will be ¶ brought online still await commercialization. Complicating the equation, Pemex is saddled with ¶ four latest- generation semisubmersible rigs that cost $500,000 per day. Because the company ¶ has been unable to drill in Perdido's ultra-deepwater, the rigs have been relegated to drilling in ¶ shallower water—work that less sophisticated technology could accomplish. Ongoing concerns ¶ over deepwater drilling in the wake of the Macondo incident, combined with memories of ¶ Pemex's less-than-aggressive response to its 1979 Ixtoc spill, have given authorities on both ¶ sides of the U.S.– Mexico border pause. An archaic constitutional ban that prevents the company ¶ from providing the proper balance of risk-reward incentives, coupled with declining production, ¶ leave Pemex few large-scale, near-term alternatives—other than forging into Perdido on its own. ¶ The accord signed by U.S. and Mexican authorities on Monday offers an elegant way to calm ¶ fears on both sides of the border. Whether joint ventures materialize or not, the accord would ¶ permit joint inspection teams the right to ensure compliance with safety and environmental ¶ laws.Will Mexico's Senate approve the accord?" ¶ A: Alejandra León, associate director for Latin America-downstream oil at IHS Cera: ¶ "**The lack of Pemex's experience in** deep and **ultradeep water operations creates a valid ¶ uncertainty about its capabilities to efficiently handle any** accident or crude **spill** in those types of ¶ operations. However, safe operations do not just depend on Pemex. Service providers play a ¶ critical role. As long as Pemex contracts highly qualified companies to develop deep and ¶ ultradeep water activities and the contracts are clear regarding environmental requirements and ¶ other responsibilities, the risk will be mitigated. In fact, prevention is the very first step in ¶ creating strategies for potential accidents or crude spills. In this sense, the role of the National ¶ Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH) is critical. As a regulator, the CNH has created clear and ¶ strict rules for deepwater operations, aligning Mexican standards to the strictest international ¶ standards. This is a good first step to prevent any serious accident or crude spill. The next ¶ challenge is to ensure that the regulation will be upheld and here the question remains if the ¶ CNH has the sufficient authority and resources to oversee Pemex's operations and guarantee the ¶ rule of law." ¶ A: David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City: ¶ "They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders. ¶ That is probably how we should understand **Pemex's** **decision to drill** the Maximino-1 well in ¶ 3,000 meters of water **in the Perdido** Fold Belt, right **next to the shared maritime boundary** with ¶ the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or ¶ production goals. It **is about defending** the final frontier of **national sovereignty and** sticking the ¶ Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico **to advise U.S. companies that they have no right ¶ to drill for oil** in the ultradeep waters **on the Mexican side.** **The** recently signed deepwater ¶ **agreement obliges both countries to work together** and share the spoils of the development of Transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional ¶ restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as **Pemex** and its ¶ contractors **have no experience in such harsh environments**. In fact, **Pemex has never produced ¶ oil commercially anywhere in deep water**. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case ¶ scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not ¶ fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. ¶ On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon ¶ spill, has come and gone. **The next disaster is just waiting to happen."** ¶ A: George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence: ¶ "The serious issues of corporate governance and regulation in the shadow of the Macondo ¶ incident have not yet been addressed in the many post-accident studies that have been released. ¶ On April 20, 2010, a joint BP-Transocean safety audit team boarded the Deepwater Horizon for ¶ an inspection of the safety practices of the crew and the condition of the facilities. The nominal ¶ objective of the inspection was to identify issues and conditions that could result in damage to ¶ lives, facilities and the environment. Within hours after the safety audit team flew off by ¶ helicopter, the Macondo well blew out. How is it that this team of senior safety auditors missed ¶ all the evidence that a catastrophe was unfolding beneath their feet? This is a question on the ¶ level of seriousness as that of the integrity of the cement that failed. The facile answer to the ¶ question is that safety, as a discipline and a concern, is divided into two parts: occupational ¶ safety, dealing with the slips and falls of employees, and process, or industrial, safety, dealing ¶ with conditions that could put the entire crew and facilities at risk. What happened on the ¶ **Deepwater Horizon** is that members of the safety audit team focused their attention on the feelgood issues of occupational safety, chit-chatting with crew members, while they ignored the fact ¶ that a cement bond log had not been run, and that proof of cement integrity was problematic at ¶ best. One measure **to avoid a repetition of this situation** would be to order, **as a matter of ¶ regulation, safety audits of industrial safety and occupational safety to be carried out separately, ¶ by different teams."**

#### Gulf ecosystems are critical biodiversity hotspots and have a key effect on the world’s oceans

Brenner ‘8

(Jorge Brenner, “Guarding the Gulf of Mexico’s valuable resources”, SciDevNet, <http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/guarding-the-gulf-of-mexico-s-valuable-resources.html>. 3-14-2008. Jorge Brenner is postdoctoral research associate at the Harte Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi.¶ EJW.) \*\*The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats— only known nesting beach of Kemp’s Ridley most threatened sea-turtles and helps the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.\*\*

Scientific collaboration on the common resources of the Gulf of Mexico has been difficult since the United States placed an economic embargo on Cuba in 1962. Research is permitted for US scientists who have a special government licence and Mexican scientists are allowed to travel to Cuba, but the political deadlock means that only a few institutions have managed to develop collaborative projects among the three countries. As a result, efforts to conserve the Gulf's valuable species and resources are being thwarted.¶ The economic embargo is widely considered as the main barrier to international marine research and conservation programmes in the Gulf. But, given that the Gulf is enclosed by three countries, an integrated view of governance of common resources should prevail over the political strategies of the individual countries.¶ This common responsibility is often overlooked. We have abused the region's ecological resources in treating them as a source of wealth while failing to share responsibility for their conservation. In my opinion, this misunderstanding of the concept of the commons — owned by everyone and no one — has probably caused more damage than the economic embargo imposed on almost self-sufficient Cuba.¶ Rich in biodiversity and habitats¶ **The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats, and hosts the only known** **nesting** beach **of** Kemp's Ridley, the **world's most endangered sea turtle**.¶ **The Gulf's circulation pattern gives it biological and socioeconomic importanc**e: **water** from the Caribbean enters from the south through the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico and, after warming in the basin, leaves through the northern Florida Strait between the United States and Cuba to **form the Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.¶**

#### Ocean biodiversity loss causes extinction

Craig 03

(Robin Kundis Craig, Associate Professor of Law at the Indiana University School of Law, 2003, “Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1289250>)

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [\*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that **many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system.** n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, n863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." n864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique.

# 2AC

## Topicality

### 2AC – Economic Engagement

We meet – Economic engagement includes energy

Sullivan 8 (Daniel, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, 8-4-8, Scoop World News, “Addressing Energy Issues in the Western Hemisphere”, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0808/S00038.htm, accessed 7-1-13)

Our two countries have also benefited from a candid exchange of views on biofuels through other channels, including the U.S. - Brazil CEO Forum, and meetings of business people, academics, and citizens groups. With Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom Shannon, I co-chair an Economic Partnership Dialogue with Brazil. Other members of the economic team at the State Department also have traveled on numerous missions to Brazil to talk with government and business groups about the whole range of our economic engagement, including biofuels. The Deputy Secretary of Energy departs for Brazil shortly to continue this broad and deep engagement.

Counter interpretation – economic engagement with Mexico pertains to energy

U.S. Chamber of Commerce 12 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce “Enhancing the U.S.-Mexico Economic Partnership” <http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/1204EnhancingtheUS-MexicoEconomicPartnership.pdf>, p. 3, accessed 6/26/13)

The U.S.-Mexico Leadership Initiative (USMLI) was launched in May 2010, on the occasion of President Felipe Calderón’s state visit to Washington, DC. Corporate members of the Initiative work with public and private sector partners in Mexico and the United States to ensure that policymakers and legislators understand the importance of our countries’ economic ties, and to focus their attention on the considerable work that remains to be done to optimize the relationship. The goal of the USMLI is to move true economic partnership between the United States and Mexico from policy aspiration to reality by making both countries more competitive in global markets; raising living standards for workers in both countries; making the U.S.-Mexican border the most modern, streamlined, and secure in the world; promoting the continent’s energy independence while respecting our shared environment; and enhancing intergovernmental cooperation, all within a framework that fully respects and supports national sovereignty and interests.

We are core of the topic—topic paper proves

Bauschard 13 (Stefan, Director of Debate at Lakeland School district and Assistant debate coach at the Harvard Debate Council Assistant Debate Coach, [Harvard Debate Council](http://harvarddebate.org" \t "_blank), “Defining ‘Economic Engagement,’” <http://bauscharddebate.com/2013/03/defining-economic-engagement/>, Accessed: 7/1/13)

What issues can be covered by economic engagement? The core question here is how the term “economic” limits the topic beyond what would be true if the topic simply said “increase its engagement with…” Obviously, the term “economic” limits the type of engagement, but contextual usage evidence doesn’t suggest that there is too much of a limit. I’ve found contextual evidence that supports including all of the following in economic engagement - Trade - Information technology - Investment - General environmental issues - Forest and wetland conservation - Water and air quality - Small & Medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) - Health care - Clean energy, including renewable energy - Electricity production and transmission - Nuclear power - General energy security - Defense and security - Economic development - Intellectual property - Reducing corruption - Food regulation - Environmental regulation How does the US engage? As noted, this question is also related to the third question because whether or not engagement can (or should) include a quid pro quo is a how question related to engagement. I separated them because the conditionality question applies to all other how issues and is really a core question about the types of acceptable Negative counterplans. For example, the US might engage by providing foreign aid, but whether or not that aid can or should be delivered as part of a quid pro quo is a separate question. In terms of specific mechanisms for engagement, contextual evidence exists for engaging in all of the following ways – -Official contacts with the government -Academic exchanges -Two track dialogue(s) -Development programs (foreign aid) -Providing loans -Working through non-governmental organizations (NGOS) -Enabling International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to support work in the topic countries -Negotiating trade agreements and facilitating trade ties -Developing standards and practices for businesses -Using the US Agency for International Development (AID) to support business development -Encouraging other countries to reduce trade barriers -Providing visas to individuals in other countries (this was an entire college resolution!) -Supporting increased investment -Helping US companies navigate the business climate -Strengthening measures to protect intellectual property -Encouraging countries to invest in the US -Integrating countries into the global economic system -Reduction in sanctions and other trade barriers -Facilitating action by IFIs -Boosting capital investment -Supporting joint technology development -Providing technical cooperation on energy environment -Facilitating the development of regulation

## D/F

## Heg

No chance of transition – policy makers will cling to the unipolar dream and other nations won’t fill the vacuum – more ev

Shalmon and Horowitz 9 (Profs of IR Dan and Mike , Orbis, Spring)

It is important to recognize at the outset two key points about United States strategy and the potential costs and benefits for the United States in a changing security environment. First, the United States is very likely to remain fully engaged in global affairs. Advocates of restraint or global withdrawal, while popular in some segments of academia, remain on the margins of policy debates in Washington D.C. This could always change, of course. However, at present, it is a given that the United States will define its interests globally and pursue a strategy that requires capable military forces able to project power around the world. Because ‘‘indirect’’ counter-strategies are the rational choice for actors facing a strong state’s power projection, irregular/asymmetric threats are inevitable given America’s role in the global order.24

## Drilling

Resilience theory is deadwrong—studies prove

Wall ’11—

(Tim Wall is a contributor to *Discovery News.* “Lack of Spare Species Leave Ecosystems Flat.” *Discovery News.*  <http://news.discovery.com/earth/global-warming/lack-of-spare-species-leaves-ecosystems-flat.htm>. Jessica Whiteside is an Assistant Professor in Geological Sciences at Brown University. She has a BA from Mt. Holyoke College, an MA and a M. Phil in Earth and Environmental Sciences from Columbia University. She has a PhD from Columbia University from the Lamont Doherty Earth Observatory. 1/11/11. EJW.)

Having back-up plans and built-in redundancy features can save lives, whether it’s emergency flares in the trunk of the car or warning lights and alarms in the cockpit of an airplane. **For Earth, failures in redundancy can lead to catastrophe.**¶ In nature, **multiple species compete for the same resources,** something called [**ecological redundancy**](http://www.ecology.info/article.aspx?cid=10&id=68)**.** For example, several species of sharks may feed on the same prey fish. If one species disappeared, the other sharks would take up the slack on chowing down on the extra fish – keeping the system in balance. **But if multiple species** of shark **go extinct**, a situation that is currently playing out, **the system can veer toward collapse.¶** For the first time **researchers** **have made a direct connection between loss of redundancy and ecosystem collapse**. Their work, published recently in the journal Geology, shows that **during extinction events in the** [**Permian**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Permian_period.aspx) **and** [**Triassic**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Triassic_period.aspx) **periods, the Earth’s ancient oceans lost critical back-up species.¶ The research holds a dire warning** about humans activitiesin the oceansand points out **the importance of preserving whole ecosystems, not just individual species.¶** “It’s definitely a cautionary tale because we know it’s happened at least twice before,” **said** Jessica **Whiteside of Brown University**, the paper’s lead author in a [**press release**](http://news.brown.edu/pressreleases/2011/01/extinction). “And you have long periods of time before you have **reestablishment of ecological redundancy**.” In these cases, it **took 10 million years for nature to balance itself out again**, the team reported.¶ Many marine biologists worry that fisheries worldwide are in collapse. Overfishing of predatory species, like bluefin tuna, sharks, and swordfish has eliminated, not just competing species, but entire levels of the food chain.¶“It is difficult to evaluate what is going on at present, given that we don’t have the advantage of the long lens of geologic history, where we can see things play out over millions of years,” Whiteside wrote in an email to Discovery News. “But there is evidence that trophic (i.e. food-web) collapse is starting to occur in some marine ecosystems.”¶ One example of ecosystem collapse in the modern world can be seen off the coast of North Carolina, Whiteside said. The disappearance of the [**blacktip shark**](http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sharks/FS_blacktipshark.htm) allowed the [**cownose ray**](http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/gallery/descript/cownoseray/cownoseray.html)population to explode. This event, called a trophic cascade, collapsed the area’s century-old [**bay scallop**](http://www.nwrc.usgs.gov/wdb/pub/species_profiles/82_11-012.pdf) industry.¶ Similar situations occurred 250 and 200 million years ago. Predators similar to the modern day[**nautilus**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/nautilus.aspx), called [**ammonites**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/ammonite.aspx), were once common and diverse. But many species went extinct after[**massive volcanic eruptions**](http://dsc.discovery.com/convergence/supervolcano/others/others_07.html) in the Permian and Triassic caused devastation and atmospheric disruption. The resulting climate change reduced ammonites to only a few species.¶ **The result was a simplified food chain.** A few hardy species survived the extinctions and became common. Generalist species expanded and filled wide ranges of the food web, as opposed to locally adapted species filling specific niches. Other **research has suggested that homogeneous populations of generalist species** can actually **slow the divergence of new species and subsequently the ecosystem’s recovery**.¶ After the ancient extinctions, biodiversity and robust ecosystems slowly re-emerged. To understand this re-emergence, the ammonite researchers analyzed carbon isotopes in the fossils. The scientists were then able to measure the stability of the carbon cycle in the ancient oceans.¶ Disruptions, like the volcanic events of the Permian and Triassic, caused species numbers to plummet. After disturbances, it took up to 10 million years for fluctuations to settle down and a stable pattern to develop. Highest species diversities of ammonites were found when the carbon isotope values were stable.¶ “The take home message is that **biodiversity matters**,” Whiteside told Discovery News. Not just because it’s nice to look at a bunch of species, she said, but because **ecosystem functioning is reduced by biodiversity loss.**

## Offfcase

## Inherency

House and Senate bills hard to reconcile

Tracy 2013 (Tennille June 27, Wall Street Journal http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324328204578572360305730962) rss

Payment disclosures are required under the 2010 Dodd-Frank law, aimed at preventing corruption and secrecy among the governments of resource-rich countries.¶ The White House said the provision in the Republican-led bill "negatively impacts U.S. efforts to increase transparency and accountability." The White House did not veto to threaten the measure but said it wanted to work with lawmakers to amend the bill.¶ The Senate is considering a similar version of the bill. The Senate measure doesn't include the same provision, which means there is a major difference between the two chambers that will have to be sorted out.¶ U.S. energy companies have long opposed the disclosure requirement. The companies contend it puts them at a competitive disadvantage to foreign companies. ¶ The nuts and bolts of the transboundary agreement was originally brokered between the Obama administration and Mexico in February 2012.

TBA Senate bill headed to conference committee—has to weather the storm

Musarra 10/15 (Sarah Parker, 2013, http://oedigital.com/engineering/vessels/item/4208-us-senate-approves-historic-transboundary-agreement-with-mexico) rss

The US Senate bill ratifying the US-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement, S. 812, is reportedly on its way to a conference committee.¶ The Senate's version of the bill, passed October 12, differed from that of the US House of Representative’s version. The House ratified the agreement but exempted US companies engaged in joint exploration agreements with Pemex from complying with Dodd-Frank disclosures. Senate’s version also ratifies the deal, but without the financial disclosure exemption.

US Must ratify by Feb 2014

Energy Solutions Forum 10/23 (2013, http://breakingenergy.com/2013/10/23/senate-approves-transboundary-hydrocarbons-agreement-bill/) rss

On October 12, 2013, the Senate unanimously approved S. 812 to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to implement the 2012 U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. The agreement establishes a legal framework for offshore drilling at the Gulf of Mexico maritime border. The Mexican Senate ratified the agreement two months after it was signed by the U.S. and Mexico in February 2012. The agreement requires U.S. ratification before the February 2014 expiration date.

## Counterplan

CP only functions in the planning process – means it doesn’t apply to the plan

Duthie et. al '07

[Jennifer Duthie, Research Associate at the Center for Transportation Research and the University of Texas, S. Travis Walker, August 2007, "Incorporating Environmental Justice Measures into Equilibrium-based Transportation Network Design Models", pg. online @ swutc.tamu.edu/publications/technicalreports/167265-1.pdf//]

Equity determinations are three-fold, examining first the equity in public participation, then equity in funding, and lastly the equity in impacts. Since the focus of this research is on technical methods, this section will look primarily at equity in funding and equity in impacts. Giving each population group equal access to the planning process is extremely important; however, unlike funding and impacts, it is not easily measured by quantitative tools. First, it should be noted that equitable funding does not imply equitable impacts. For example, group A and group B could be allocated equal funds, but if A decides to use its funds to run a highway through the center of B’s community, the resulting impacts will likely be inequitable. Distribution of impacts and funding into the future is difficult to measure because metropolitan transportation plans (MTPs) cannot, due to their long time frame, specify projects in great detail. Much of the money allocated in MTPs goes towards programs that act as funding mechanisms for projects to be specified at a later date. Some entries in the MTP such as capacity improvements on a corridor may contain more detail than entries such as a program for funding intelligent transportation systems (ITS). Until projects are selected, there is no accurate way of evaluating the impact that will be felt by each population. Any calculation of program benefits that occurs before projects are selected will be a rough regional estimate, unsuited for group-level analysis. It is similarly difficult to determine years in advance the distribution of funding among population groups as it is not specified as such in the plan.

## Kritik

Perm Solves – focus on the present and future – need positive actions

**Galles 9** (Gary, Professor of Economics at Pepperdine, Ph.D. in Economics from UCLA, DEC. 29, “Thinking Resolutions Through”, <http://blog.mises.org/11344/thinking-resolutions-through/>) KENTUCKY

Resolutions can miss their mark because we resolve to improve where we are already good, while ignoring our weaknesses, such as a great salesman’s determination to hone those skills further, while overlooking weaknesses at parenting or “husbanding**.” Since we can change only the present and future, resolutions must focus there. But many instead overwhelm themselves with guilt about their past and give up as hopeless any chance of “making up for it” or addressing those problems. We cannot change the past, but we can apologize now, forgive now and begin to make past wrongs right now. Letting the past stop these acts today is simply making another mistake. Other times, people become so focused on the past that they sacrifice their present and future in a futile effort to unmake the past or to avenge previous wrongs, real or imagined, that cannot be changed. We sometimes resolve to fix everything about ourselves at once. Therefore, we soon don’t even remember all our resolutions, much less put them into practice — a recipe for failure, leading to still more guilt feelings and discouragement from ever facing our issues, as any binge dieter can attest.** We resolve to control our emotions. However, we can only control what we do, not what we feel. Appropriate actions do often lead to appropriate feelings (the best way to begin feeling charitable is often to begin practicing charity), **but trying to control the uncontrollable by sheer willpower is a setup for failure.** **We resolve to always or never do things.** But **in areas that give us trouble, lapses are** almost **certain. That sets us up to quit as soon as we first falter, short-circuiting chances for success in areas that involve more substantial processes over time**. We resolve to just live for today. But “eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die” is often poor advice. Living more for today can be an antidote to sacrificing current happiness to invest everything in hopes of a better future, but what we do today has important impacts tomorrow. That is why, when we talk to our children about serious issues like drugs, sex, education, etc., we emphasize that they shouldn’t just live for today. **We resolve to fix others and their attitudes toward us. But this is often futile, beyond creating resentment from those we are trying to “fix.” The only persons we are sure we can improve are ourselves.** We can become more likeable, but we can’t make someone like us. We can resist giving offense, but not assure that no offense will be taken. Similarly, **we resolve to be more successful. But we only control our efforts, not the results.** Further, **failure to quickly achieve “success” resolutions, as opposed to resolutions to keep trying until we succeed, often leads people to give up completely.**

Consequentialism is best – extinction outweighs – epistemology doesn’t matter

Cowen 4 (Tyler Cowen 4, Department of Economics George Mason University, November 2, 2004 , “The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism”)

As the above arguments suggest, the epistemic critique increases the plausibility of what I call “big event consequentialism.” In this view, we should pursue good consequences, but with special attention to consequences that are very important and very good, or correspondingly, very bad. Consequences of these kinds include stopping the use of nuclear weapons, saving children from smallpox, making progress against global poverty, and maintaining or spreading liberal democracy. Big events, as I define them, typically are of significant practical importance, involve obvious moral issues, and their value is not controversial to benevolent onlookers. In contrast consider “small events.” Preventing a broken leg for a single dog, however meritorious an act, is a small event as I define the concept. Making American families wealthier by another $20 also would count as a small event. We should not count small events for nothing, but epistemic issues may well lower their importance in reflective equilibrium. Of course we do not need a strict dividing line between big and small events, but rather we can think in terms of a continuum. In some cases a large number of small benefits will sum up to a big benefit, or equal the big benefit in importance. It then can be argued that we should treat the large benefits and the small benefits on a par. If we lift a different person out of poverty one billion times, this is no less valuable than lifting one billion people out of poverty all at once. Here two points are of relevance. First, sometimes we are facing a single choice in isolation from other choices, rather than examining a rule or general principle of behavior. In this case it does not matter whether or not the small benefits would, if combined in larger numbers, sum up to a greater benefit. The small benefits will not be combined in greater numbers, and we should still upgrade the relative importance of larger benefits in our decision calculus. Second, not all small benefits sum into equivalence with larger benefits. Sometimes one value has a lexical relationship to (all or some) other values. For instance arguably a large number of canine broken legs, even a very very large number, do not sum in value to make a civilization. It does not matter how many dogs and how many broken legs enter the comparison. In other words, civilization may be a lexical value with respect to canine broken legs. And when lexical elements are present, the mere cumulation of numbers of broken legs does not trump the more significant value. Numerous value relationships have been cited as lexical. A large number of slight headaches, no matter how numerous, may not sum up in value to equal a smaller number of intensely painful deaths or personal tortures (Norcross 1997). A very large number of “muzak and potato” lives (Parfit 1986, 1987) do not sum to overtake the value of a sophisticated civilization. Rawls (1987) put forward liberty and the difference principle as his lexical values for all political comparisons. For our purposes, we do not require a very strict notion of lexicality for these designations to have relevance to our endeavor. A big value need not be lexical against a (multiplied) smaller value at all possible margins. Instead the big value need only be lexical across the comparisons that arise under relevant policy comparisons. Furthermore a big value need not be lexical in absolute terms against all other smaller values. We therefore receive further guidance as to which big events are upgraded in the most robust fashion. The big values that receive the most robust upgrading would be those values with some lexical importance, relative to possible comparisons against other smaller values.9 To sum up these points, critics of consequentialism would like to establish something like the following: “We find it hard to predict consequences. Therefore consequences do not matter very much, relative to other factors, such as deontology or virtue ethics. We should abandon consequentialist morality.” But so far epistemic considerations have yet to produce a strong argument for this view. The arguments support a different conclusion, namely downgrading the importance of minor consequences, and upgrading the importance of major consequences. The most robust major consequences are those that carry values with some lexical properties, and cannot be replicated by a mere accumulation of many small benefits.

Exclusive focus on method causes endless paradigm wars – good is good enough

Wendt, professor of international security – Ohio State University, ‘98

(Alexander, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The central point of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will inevitably lead to confusion (after all, after 2000 years, even the specialists are still having a hard time). Moreover, as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions either. It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge. In that light, going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, not second-order issues of method. Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to epistemological discourse. The problem is that this discourse has already contamin- ated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘paradigm wars’. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And do post-positivists really mean to suggest that students of social life should not ask causal questions or attempt to test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is not clear by what criteria their work should be judged, or how it differs from art or revelation. On both sides, in other words, the result of the Third Debate’s sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures of science.

No root causes and deterrence solves proximate conflict escalation

Moore 4 Walter L. Brown Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law (John Norton Moore, “Solving the War Puzzle: beyond the democratic peace,” pg 41-43)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of many traditional “causes” of war? Past and many contemporary, theories of war and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of “honor”, or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that are the key to most effectively controlling war….Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.

**Discourse of danger – speaking against America opens us up to attack from evil communist powers**

**Nyquist 11 –** former Russia analyst for the DOD and all-American superstar

(J.R., “A Philosopher’s Warning,” <http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jr-nyquist/a-philosopher-warning>, dml)

It is Carvalho’s view that the “open society” concept has been used by the nation’s enemies to destroy “everything that is good and great in this country.” He then pointed to the Russian geopolitical thinker, Alexander Dugin, and “the emerging Russian-Chinese scheme....” Using a subtle propaganda, noted Carvalho, the “open society” becomes a pretext for fostering widespread global hatred against the United States. For the “open society” produces moral degradation that is subsequently blamed on the American way of life, which supposedly demonstrates the special wickedness and decadence of the American people. This leads directly to a discussion of the evils of American cultural imperialism -- the rallying cry of Russian and Chinese strategists whose goal is the elimination of the United States as a world power. The effectiveness of this approach should not be underestimated. As Carvalho explained, “The Russian-Chinese influence has been growing more and more in Latin America. The U.S. Government has missed this because it still sees Russia and China as allies, in spite of the fact that they are the two largest weapons suppliers to terrorism around the world. One must remember that the Putin government’s foreign policy is today guided by the so-called ‘Eurasian’ strategy, invented by Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin, who proposes that Russia, China, and Islam ally with all the anti-American forces in Western Europe, Africa and Latin America, for the purpose of laying final siege to the United States. This strategy already has strong military support in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a kind of eastern version of NATO, which brings together Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.”

**Reject them – their authors decry American imperialism in order to destroy all that is good – their argument justifies every atrocity in recent history**

**Nyquist 5 –** former Russia analyst for the DOD and all-American superstar

(J.R., “Chavez, Castro, and Robertson,” <http://www.financialsense.com/node/336>, dml)

The Pravda headline for August 23 read: "U.S. preacher Pat Robertson calls upon the USA to kill President Hugo Chavez." There followed a subheading: "Cuba and Venezuela to unite Latin American states to confront the growing imperial aggression of the USA." According to Pravda, America exports freedom to the countries of the former Soviet Union while its Latin American neighbors are creating a "center of active resistance...." The main figures in this center of resistance are Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and "the unsinkable Fidel Castro." The two communist leaders recently made a joint appearance on Cuban television and declared that "America" is threat number one. According to President Chavez, "The grand destroyer of the world, and the greatest threat ... is represented by U.S. imperialism." Think about this for a moment. The greatest threat is not al Qaeda. The greatest threat is not Red China or the Soviet resurgence under Vladimr Putin. One may dismiss the threat posed by a nuclear-equipped Iran or a communist revolution sweeping Latin America. President Chavez, who championed the cause of Saddam Hussein and gave millions to finance the Taliban's war effort, said on Aug. 8 that America is the "most savage, cruel and murderous empire that has existed in the history of the world." Here we find the narrative of the Marxist-Leninist: "Socialism is the only path ... [to] save a world threatened by the voracity of U.S. imperialism." Chavez offered these words (earlier this month) at the 16th World Festival of Students and Youth, a communist extravaganza first hosted in Czechoslovakia during the Cold War. According to the communist way of thinking, the terrorists of 9/11 and the narco-terrorists in Colombia (i.e., the Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia) are allies in the struggle against U.S. imperialism. The real terrorist nation is America. The crimes of Stalin were committed to stop the Americans. The atrocities of Mao and Pol Pot were necessary in order to combat the stooges of American imperialism in China and Cambodia. The communist purges in North Korea, Vietnam and the African red states were necessary measures to ensure the victory of socialism. Since America is the greatest evil "that has existed in the history of the world," then ruthless measures are always justified. In terms of "politically correct" history, the dictators of the communist world were the "good guys. America's leaders were ever and always the bad guys. It is useful, of course, to denounce Stalin and Pol Pot. They are gone, so why defend them? Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, hides his communist beliefs. He is a new man - a man whose crimes haven't been fully documented (as yet). But he nonetheless follows the path of Lenin and Stalin. According to [Peter Baker and Susan Glasser](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0743264312/qid=1125062904/sr=2-1/ref=pd_bbs_b_2_1/103-2306549-8183831?v=glance&s=books) of the Washington Post, "Putin essentially threatened to mutilate a French reporter's penis for asking about Russian tactics that endangered Chechen civilians." Brutality will always be a characteristic of political communism. It is the key to Chavez and to Castro. [The Black Book of Communism](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0674076087/qid=1125063264/sr=2-1/ref=pd_bbs_b_2_1/103-2306549-8183831?v=glance&s=books) documents the crimes, terror and repression of Castro's regime - thereby anticipating the terrorism of Chavez. "During the repressions of the 1960s, between 7,000 and 10,000 people were killed and 30,000 imprisoned for political reasons," the Black Book noted. Castro formed neighborhood committees "for Defense of the Revolution" so that his followers could keep watch on "counterrevolutionary activities." The result was tight social control in the totalitarian style. One may hear ignorant persons talk of Cuba's vibrant economy and free population. But nonsense is nonsense, however colored by the false front of the regime. Predictably, some readers will complain that America is "the real" totalitarian country. But nobody is fleeing Miami for Havana. You can always tell a totalitarian state by the fact that people vote with their feet - by leaving the country (at personal risk). In decrying the imperialism of the United States, the totalitarians tell one lie after another. They are the great distorters of history. And they have insinuated their dangerous propaganda into the political discourse of Europe and America. Consequently the masses, unwary in their acceptance of disguised communist ideas, have swallowed the Great Fable of American imperialism. Ask someone if they think America is the main threat today and I'll show you someone who picked up the wrong magazine or newspaper - not realizing its slant or pedigree. The Nazis denounced America as a Jewish state and blamed the Jews for starting World War II. The communist denounce America as an imperialist state and prepare to blame the Americans for starting World War III. The writing is on the wall. The propaganda has already done its work. And should the American economy falter, the propaganda will get more and more blatant until it begins to resemble the old Stalinist rant (and the raw insistence that America should be destroyed if the world is to know peace). Communism conceives itself as the principle movement for stopping (American) imperialism. Many decades ago, the founder of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin, said: "We who struggle against imperialism represent an alliance demanding close military solidarity, and any attempts to disrupt this solidarity will be viewed as a totally inadmissible phenomenon, as betrayal of the interests of the struggle...." In a Russian military text with the title "Marxism-Leninism On War and Army," we read: "The deepening of the general crisis of capitalism in the post-war years and the intensification of its contradictions have made the politics of imperialism more adventuristic. It now constitutes an ever greater danger to the peoples, to peace and social progress. The imperialists are preparing a new world war, and have repeatedly provoked international crises, which have pushed mankind to the brink of thermonuclear conflict." According to the Russian communists, "U.S. imperialism has become the most aggressive force of international imperialist reaction. It is marked by ferocious hatred of socialism and the revolutionary movement...." If you imagine that this way of thinking no longer directs Moscow's policy or Beijing's policy, then you have misread the situation. The pretense of democracy, the trick of adopting capitalism (in China and Russia), is a long-term strategic maneuver. Cuba's Fidel Castro and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez have a role to play in this maneuver as they threaten to spread communism to Bolivia and Colombia. Take note of their theme: All terrorists who oppose America are justified in their terrorism. Stalin was justified in his terrorism, and Pol Pot and Mao and Kim Jong Il. All justified because America - they tell us - is the enemy of mankind. America is the true evil. "We are the good guys," say the communists. Communist propaganda has a strategic objective. Blacken America's name, place a question mark over America's motives and rally the malcontents. There is only one reason the communists have failed to take over the world. That reason is the United States (i.e., American imperialism). Without American nuclear weapons to counter Soviet nuclear weapons the rest of the world would have been forced into a totalitarian straitjacket. It therefore makes sense that Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro want to remove the United States as an obstacle. It makes sense that both men are obsessed with fighting a future war against America. I believe, given the right circumstances, they would provoke such a war, and are willing to sacrifice their respective countries. According to [Georgie Anne Geyer](http://scholar.google.com/url?sa=U&q=http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v024/24.1geyer.pdf), who interviewed Castro four times, "Castro's ambition was always bigger than the island of Cuba." As Geyer explained, "countries normally mean nothing to men with these enormous pretensions...."

No link to their kritik of hegemony and studies prove its peaceful

Busby 12 [Get Real Chicago IR guys out in force, Josh, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. <http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html>]

Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, I've been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all" \t "_new) that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html" \t "_new) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity (at least for Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity **compared** to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/" \t "_new), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. But, if my read of other [reports](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) based on Uppsala data is right**,** war is becoming more rare and less deadly (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/" \t "_new) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media .Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II. Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So, I kind of took issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. In Monteiro's world, disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.

**Heg solves extinction – their K endorses a world order of comparatively more violence – we have statistics on our side, comparatively less death and structural violence in the American age**

**Barnett, 11** - chief analyst at Wikistrat, former visiting scholar at the University of Tennessee’s Howard Baker Center for Public Policy and a visiting strategist at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies (Thomas, World Politics Review, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” 3/7, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>  
  
It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as [the Facebook revolutions](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8089/the-realist-prism-politics-vs-social-media-in-the-arab-uprising" \t "_blank) erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

**Our ontology is good – deterrence as ontology breaks from cycles of violence and solves ontological security**

**Lupovici 8 –** Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto

(Amir, “Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse”, paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association annual conference, Vancouver June 4-6, 2008, <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf>, dml)

Since deterrence can become part of the actors’ identity, it is also involved in the actors’ will to achieve ontological security, securing the actors’ identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological security is “the acquisition of confidence in the routines of daily life—the essential predictability of interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical skill to go on in this context.” These routines become part of the social structure that enables and constrains the actors’ possibilities (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus, through the emergence of the deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors create an intersubjective context and intersubjective understandings that in turn affect their interests and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices are better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within such a context of deterrence relations, rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this context and the actors’ identities. Therefore, the internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more cooperative practices and break away from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the identities that are attached to the security dilemma, and which lead to mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in situations where states are restrained from using violence—such as MAD (mutual assured destruction)—states not only avoid violence, but “ironically, may be willing to trust each other enough to take on collective identity”. In such cases if actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of their role identities may all lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the practices of deterrence as well as the avoidance of violence. Since a basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security, 21 the existence of it may further strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors’ identities of deterrer and deterred actors. In this respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices of deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and ontological security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussen’s (2002: 331-2) assertion—according to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical security—is only partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical security, since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about decreasing the physical threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension of security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors’ identities and created more stable expectations of avoiding violence.

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Extinction outweighs – it’s the most horrible impact imaginable and precedes rights

Schell 82 (Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, *The Fate of the Earth*, pages 136-137)

Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the predicament. I have pointed out that our species is the most important of all the things that, as inhabitants of a common world, we inherit from the past generations, but it does not go far enough to point out this superior importance, as though in making our decision about ex- tinction we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and the survival of the species, on the other. For the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to de- stroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room, or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, how- ever, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death-"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives

One is morally obligated to divert to utilitarianism if the alternative is extinction.

Kateb**,** prof. of politics at Princeton University, **19**92 (George, “The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture”, p. 12)

The main point, however, is that utilitarianism has a necessary pace in any democratic country's normal political deliberations. But its advocates must know its place, which ordinarily is only to help to decide what the theory of rights leaves alone. When may rights be overridden by government? I have two sorts of cases in mind: overriding a particular right of some persons for the sake of preserving the same right of others, and overriding the same right of everyone for the sake of what I will clumsily call "civilization values." An advocate of rights could countenance, perhaps must countenance, the state's overriding of rights for these two reasons. The subject is painful and liable to dispute every step of the way. For the state to override is, sacrifice—a right of some so that others may keep it. the situation must be desperate. I have in mind, say, circumstances in which the choice is between sacrificing a right of some and letting a right of all be lost. The state (or some other agent) may kill some (or allow them to he killed), if the only alternative is letting every-one die. It is the right to life which most prominently figures in thinking about desperate situations. I cannot see any resolution but to heed the precept that "numbers count." Just as one may prefer saving one's own life to saving that of another when both cannot be saved, so a third parry—let us say, the state—can (perhaps must) choose to save the greater number of lives and at the cost of the lesser number, when there is otherwise no hope for either group. That choice does not mean that those to be sacrificed are immoral if they resist being sacrificed. It follows, of course, that if a third party is right to risk or sacrifice the lives of the lesser for the lives of the greater number when the lesser would otherwise live, the lesser are also not wrong if they resist being sacrificed.

Turn—offshore drilling helps marine ecosystems

Fontova 9 (Humberto Fontova, Latin American Studies, Tulane University, citing an LSU study and federal biologists, 4-28-09, American Thinker, “Offshore Oil Drilling: An Environmental Bonanza” http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/04/offshore\_oil\_drilling\_an\_envir.html, accessed 6-30-13)¶ The proliferation of marine life around oil production platforms turned on its head every "environmental expert" opinion of its day. The original plan, mandated by federal environmental "experts" back in the late '40s, was to remove the big, ugly, polluting, environmentally hazardous contraptions as soon as they stopped producing. Fine, said the oil companies. About 15 years ago some wells played out off Louisiana and the oil companies tried to comply. Their ears are still ringing from the clamor fishermen put up. Turns out those platforms are going nowhere, and by popular demand of those with a bigger stake in the marine environment than any "environmentalist." Every "environmental" superstition against these structures was turned on its head. Marine life had exploded around these huge artificial reefs: A study by LSU's Sea Grant college shows that 85 percent of Louisiana fishing trips involve fishing around these platforms. The same study shows 50 times more marine life around an oil production platform than in the surrounding Gulf bottoms. An environmental study (by apparently honest scientists) revealed that urban runoff and treated sewage dump 12 times the amount of petroleum into the Gulf than those thousands of oil production platforms. And oil seeping naturally through the ocean floor into the Gulf, where it dissipates over time, accounts for 7 times the amount spilled by rigs and pipelines in any given year.¶ The Flower Garden coral reefs lie off the Louisiana-Texas border. Unlike any of the Florida Keys reefs, they're surrounded by dozens of offshore oil platforms. These have been pumping away for the past 50 years. Yet according to G.P. Schmahl, a Federal biologist who worked for decades in both places, "The Flower Gardens are much healthier, more pristine than anything in the Florida Keys. It was a surprise to me," he admits. "And I think it's a surprise to most people."¶ "A key measure of the health of a reef is the amount of area taken up by coral," according to a report by Steve Gittings, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's science coordinator for marine sanctuaries. "Louisiana's Flower Garden boasts nearly 50 percent coral cover. In the Florida Keys it can run as little as 5 percent.

No root causes and deterrence solves proximate conflict escalation

Moore 4 Walter L. Brown Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law (John Norton Moore, “Solving the War Puzzle: beyond the democratic peace,” pg 41-43)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of many traditional “causes” of war? Past and many contemporary, theories of war and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of “honor”, or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that are the key to most effectively controlling war….Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.

Rejection of US leadership would increase imperialism and colonialism.

Christian REUS-SMIT IR @ Australian Nat’l ‘4 American Power and World Order p. 121-123

My preference here is to advocate a forward-leaning, prudential strategy of institutionally governed change. By `forward-leaning', I mean that the progressive realization of cosmopolitan values should be the measure of success­ful politics in international society. As long as gross viola­tions of basic human rights mar global social life, we, as individuals, and the states that purport to represent us, have obligations to direct what political influence we have to the improvement of the human condition, both at home and abroad. I recommend, however, that our approach be prudent rather than imprudent. Historically, the violence of inter-state warfare and the oppression of imperial rule have been deeply corrosive of basic human rights across the globe. The institutions of international society, along with their constitutive norms, such as sover­eignty**,** non-intervention, self-determination and limits on the use of force, have helped to reduce these corrosive forces dramatically. The incidence of inter-state wars has declined markedly, even though the number of states has multiplied, and imperialism and colonialism have moved from being core institutions of international society to practices beyond the pale. Prudence dictates, therefore, that we lean forward without losing our footing on valu­able institutions and norms. This means, in effect, giving priority to institutionally governed change, working with the rules and procedures of international society rather than against them. What does this mean in practice? In general, I take it to mean two things. First, it means recognizing the principal rules of international society, and accepting the obligations they impose on actors, including oneself. These rules fall into two broad categories: procedural and substantive. The most specific procedural rules are embodied in insti­tutions such as the United Nations Security Council, which is empowered to 'determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression' and the measures that will be taken 'to maintain or restore international peace and security'.28 More general, yet equally crucial, procedural rules include the cardinal principle that states are only bound by rules to which they have consented. Even customary international law, which binds states without their express consent, is based in part on the assumption of their tacit consent. The substantive rules of international society are legion, but perhaps the most important are the rules governing the use of force, both when force is permitted (jus ad bellum) and how it may be used (jus in bello). Second, working with the rules and procedures of international society also means recognizing that the principal modality of in­novation and change must be communicative. That is, establishing new rules and mechanisms for achieving cosmopolitan ends and international public goods, or modifying existing ones, should be done through persua­sion and negotiation, not ultimatum and coercion. A pre­mium must be placed, therefore, on articulating the case for change, on recognizing the concerns and interests of others as legitimate, on building upon existing rules, and on seeing genuine communication as a process of give and take, not demand and take. Giving priority to institutionally governed change may seem an overly conservative strategy, but it need not be. As explained above, the established procedural and substantive rules of international society have de­livered international public goods that actually further cosmopolitan ends, albeit in a partial and inadequate fash­ion. Eroding these rules would only lead to increases in inter-state violence and imperialism, and this would almost certainly produce a radical deterioration in the protection of basic human rights across the globe. Saying that we ought to preserve these rules is prudent, not con­servative. More than this, though, we have learnt that the institutions of international society have transformative potential, even if this is only now being creatively exploited.

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(Amir, “Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse”, paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association annual conference, Vancouver June 4-6, 2008, <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf>, dml)

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